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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of "comparable worth" 1 has ignited a fiery debate among
employment discrimination experts, 2 feminists, 3 the business community, 4
1. "The controversial theory of 'comparable value' or 'worth' holds that
whole classes ofjobs are traditionally undervalued and underpaid because they are
held by women and that this inequality amounts to sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Spelfogel, Equal Pay for Work of Com-
parable Value: A New Concept, 32 LAB. L.J. 30, 31 (1981).
2. See E. LIVERNASH, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES
(1980); C. OWENS, PAY EQUITY FOR WOMEN: A SPECIAL REPORT (1981); Com-
parable Worth Issues Addressed by Specialists at NYC Symposium, BNA DAILY LAB. REP.
No. 58, at A-3 (March 26, 1981); Comparable Worth Theories Debated by Speakers at
Chicago Conference, BNA DAILY LAB. REP. No. 103, at A-1 (May 27, 1980).
3. See Celarier, Paycheck Challenge of the Eighties-Comparing Job Worth, Ms.,
Mar. 1981, at 38; Elisburg, Pay Equity: Its Time Has Come, SPOKESWOMAN, Apr.
1980, at 6; Williamson, Equal Payfor Work of Comparable Value, WORKING WOMAN,
Jan. 1981, at 10. See also MANUAL ON PAY EQUITY: RAISING WAGES FOR
WOMEN'S WORK (J. Grune ed. 1980).
4. See Carter, Comparable Worth: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 60 PERSON-
NELJ. 792 (1981); Cody, Comparable Worth Rules: Another Weight to Balance, 68 MGMT.
REV. 31 (1979); Moskal, Should Wages Reflect What ajob is Worth?, INDUSTRY WEEK,
May 12, 1980, at 98; A New BasisforJob Discrimination, BUS. WK., Aug. 24, 1981,
at 90; Brennan, The Comparable Worth ofJobs, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 23.
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government agencies,5 and everyone else with a passing interest in money.
Not surprisingly, this conundrum has been thrust into the lap of the judiciary
for resolution. The courts have responded in a tentative, haphazard man-
ner that has served only to muddy the waters and increase the editorial
vehemence of interested commentators. 6 This Comment examines the ex-
panding controversy and speculates about the future of comparable worth
claims.
II. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF A COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIM
Statistics indicate that women are and will continue to be an integral
part of the United States labor force. 7 Nonetheless, the position staked out
for the working woman has never been particularly wholesome or financially
rewarding.8 Although overt sex discrimination may be a remnant of the not-
so-distant past, 9 the plight of the woman worker remains essentially
5. Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) have become involved
in the comparable worth controversy. See notes 120-25 and accompanying text infra.
6. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable
Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 231, 242-43, 289-94 (1980)(com-
parable worth "would be grossly unfair and impracticable, and would cause a drastic
and undesirable upheaval in the American economy."). See also Comment, The Com-
parable Worth Theory: A Critical Analysis, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 629 (1980); Pandora's
Worth, L.A. DAILYJ., July 20, 1981, at 4.
7. Approximately 49 million women were in the labor force in 1979. This
amounted to more than two-fifths of all workers and sixty percent of working age
women. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, 20 FACTS ON WOMEN
WORKERS (1980). One expert has conducted statistical analyses of the participation
rate of working women and concluded that by 1990, "about 52 million women will
be in the labor force." R. SMITH, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1990, at V
(1979). For a detailed discussion of the past and current position of the woman
worker in the United States, see generally WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE (A.
Cahn ed. 1979); THE SUBTLE REVOLUTION: WOMEN AT WORK 3-19 (R. Smith
ed. 1979).
8. Prior to the 1960s, the integration of women workers was hindered by pro-
tective labor laws. These laws restricted the type of work women could do, the hours
women could work, and the working conditions under which a woman could be
employed. For a further discussion of these laws, see generally Freeman, The Legal
Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 203, 213-30 (1971). These laws
were used to deny women equal opportunity in employment as well as equal pay.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, SUMMARY OF STATE LABOR LAWS
FOR WOMEN (1969).
9. The federal civil rights legislation of the 1960s and 1970s has provided
women with a measure of protection. "Under the doctrine of federal supremacy,
state protective laws are invalidated to the extent that they defeat the purpose of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They cannot therefore be used to support
a bona fide occupational qualification that would not stand independently of such
laws." 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 5-11 (1980).
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unchanged. The average woman working full-time earns only sixty percent
of the average male worker's pay.10 The major reason for this wage gap is
the occupational segregation that pervades the American labor force.11
Though conspicuous strides have been made in certain areas, 12 eighty per-
cent of working women remain trapped in six traditional fortresses of female
employment. 13
10. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, 20 FACTS ON WOMEN
WORKERS (1980). Indeed, women with college degrees earn less, on the average,
than men with eighth grade educations. Similarly, women who have high school
diplomas earn less, on the average, than men who failed to finish elementary school.
Id. Seegenerally A. AMSDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN AND WORK (1980). Re-
cent government statistics indicate that this situation has not changed and that
women receive lower wages than men when both are doing the same work. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Mar. 7, 1982, at 1, col.1.
11. Working women generally are employed to do different things than work-
ing men. The problem lies in the fact that there are so few jobs working women
fill. In 1980, Labor Solicitor Carin Clauss noted that over 90% of working women
could be grouped into 8 of the Labor Department's 400job tides. Wage discrimina-
tion in these areas is considered traditional. Federal EEO Policy and Comparable Worth,
1980 LAB. REL. Y.B. 90.
12. Between 1950 and 1976, the proportion of female lawyers and judges rose
from 4.1% to 9.2 %, an increase of 124%. The corresponding increases for some
other occupations were: accountants, 81%; engineers, 50%; physicians and
osteopaths, 97 %; college and university teachers and presidents, 37 %; bank of-
ficials and financial managers, 111%; buyers and purchasing agents, 152 %. Nelson,
Opton & Wilson, supra note 6, at 233 n.2. The percentage increase in these profes-
sions may be somewhat misleading. In real terms, for example, there were only
5.1 % more female lawyers in 1976 than there were in 1950.
13. The occupational profile of the female labor force in 1977 was as follows:
36 %-clerical workers
21 %-service workers
8%-educators, librarians, social workers
61%-retail sales workers, peddlers
51%-nurses, health technicians
4%-clothing and textile workers
The female percentage of each of these groups was as follows:
clerical workers-79 %
service workers-62 %
educators, librarians, social workers-64 %
sales clerks, peddlers- 67 %
nurses, health technicians-83 %
textile workers-76 %
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND EAR-
NINGS (1977). A number of explanations have been offered for this phenomenon.
See generally Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 6, at 244-64. It has been argued,
for example, that women have not obtained the skill, training, and work experience
necessary to perform certain tasks. While men and women generally see their role
in society as being different and train themselves accordingly, it is unlikely that this
3
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In 1977, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the federal agency charged with administering Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,' 4 hired the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to investigate
explains the entire wage gap. One study analyzed the salary structure of a large
university. After taking into account age, education, the nature of the job in ques-
tion, the number of years on the job, and marital status, the study found that a
significant gap remained between the earnings of males and females. Gordon &
Morton, The Staff Salary Structure of a Large University, 11 J. HUMAN RESOURCES
374, 377 (1976). An economist has reported that the average on-the-job training
period for a white male is twice as long as that given to women and black males.
The study concludes that one long-term consequence of this difference in training
may be an even more egregious wage gap between men with one leg up the ladder
of success and women whose training can best be termed incomplete. Hoffman,
Race and Sex Linked Training Differences, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,July 1981, at 34, 36.
To the extent women drop in and out of the labor force, they cannot expect
to maintain pay parity with those whose job tenure has been uninterrupted. A study
of the employment situation of married and unmarried women, however, belies
the notion that job interruptions are responsible for the male-female wage gap. The
study found that unmarried female workers, whose average job tenure equaled that
of male workers of the same age, earned about the same amount of money as mar-
ried women. The continuous work experience of the unmarried female reduced the
earnings gap by only a single percentage point. Sawhill, The Economics ofDiscrimina-
lion Against Women: Some New Findings, 8 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 383, 391 (1973).
14. 42 U.S.C. §5 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Title VII pro-
vides, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
Id. 5 2000e-2(a) (1976). The enforcement mechanisms for Title VII are set out in
the subsequent sections of the statute. Title VII can be enforced by private parties
or by a government agency. The EEOC is empowered to prevent any person from
engaging in unlawful employment practices under Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(a). The
EEOC is authorized to investigate employment practices and, if necessary, to file
suit in federal district court. Id. § 2000e-5(b), (f). Any individual seeking to challenge
discriminatory employment practices under Title VII is required to file a charge
with the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If state or local law prohibits the act alleged, and
a state or local entity has enforcement powers, the charge must be referred to the
state or local unit. If no action is taken within 60 days, the EEOC is free to assert
jurisdiction. Id. § 2000e-5(c), (d). The EEOC may file enforcement proceedings
if it deems legal action necessary. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(2), (i). If the EEOC dismisses
the complaint or fails to act within 180 days of its filing, the complainant may sue
the employer on his or her own behalf. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
4
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the economic position of the working woman. 15 The NAS report, recently
published after four years of research, confirms that the female worker's quest
for equality is far from complete. 6 The NAS found that less than half of
the wage disparity 7 between full-time men and full-time women workers
can be linked to nondiscriminatory factors such as the greater skill or ex-
perience of male employees.'8 The study stressed that the rigid job segregation
that defines the American labor force is an important source of the wage
differentiation.1 9 "Women... are differentially concentrated in low pay-
ingjobs not only by occupation, but also by industry, by firm, and by divi-
sion within firms.' '20 Moreover, the NAS study concluded that in many in-
stances, jobs held predominantly by women are less lucrative "at least in
part because they are held mainly by women.''21
III. THE STATUTORY FOUNDATION OF A COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIM
The concept of comparable worth is a reaction to the stringent re-
quirements of the 1963 Equal Pay Act (EPA). 22 The EPA was enacted to
15. The EEOC also requested that the NAS explore whether "appropriate
job measurement procedures exist or could be developed to assess the worth ofjobs."
D. TREIMAN, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW-INTERIM REPORT TO
THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION i (1979).
16. "On the basis of a review of the evidence, our judgment is that there is
substantial discrimination in pay" between male and female employees. Treiman
& Hartmann, Women, Work and Wages: Equal Pay forJobs ofEqual Value (1981),
reprinted in THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE: A BNA SPECIAL REPORT 120 (1981).
17. "It is well established that in the United States today women earn less than
men .... Among year-round full-time workers, the annual earnings of white women
in the 1970s averaged less than 60% of those of white men .... Such differential
earnings patterns have existed for many decades." Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 121.
20. Id.
21. Id. The Academy had three explanations for this conclusion. First, when
male and female jobs are compared and factors influencing job value and produc-
tivity are held constant, there remains an unexplained differential in pay between
male and female employees. Second, the discriminatory wage practices of the past
have been built into current wage structures and continue to affect these pay plans.
Finally, at the level of the individual firm, evidence indicates that a sex-based wage
disparity exists even among employees whose jobs have identical values in job
evaluation plans. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). The Equal Pay Act of 1963, a part of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
5
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equalize the wages of men and women doing equal work. 23 The EPA man-
date of equal pay is not triggered, however, unless the work done requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility and is performed under similar
circumstances. 24 The judiciary has made it dear that the equal work require-
ment is satisfied if the female employee is doing work "substantially equal"
to that of a higher-paid male employee. 25 Even when the equal work bar-
rier is surmounted, the EPA recognizes four affirmative defenses that
employers may assert to escape liability. 26 Despite its stringent equal work
standard and four affirmative defenses, the EPA has enabled many women
to challenge sex-based wage discrimination. In the 1980 fiscal year, the
EEOC distributed over $3.2 million to female victims of wage discrimina-
tion under the EPA. 27 To the extent that working women are occupationally
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii)
a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quality or quan-
tity of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex: Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage differential in viola-
tion of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
The EPA originally was administered by the Wage and Hour Division of the
Labor Department. In July 1979, these responsibilities were transferred to the
EEOC. See 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978). "The ... [EEOC] adopted the Labor
Department's investigative and enforcement procedures and later issued procedural
regulations with no substantive changes." 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 7-1 (1981).
23. "[W]e can expect that the administration of the equal pay concept, while
fair and effective, will not be excessive nor excessively wide ranging. What we seek
is to insure, where men and women are doing the same job under the same work-
ing conditions that they will receive the same pay." 109 Cong. Rec. 9196 (1963)
(statement of Rep. Frelinghuysen). See also id. at 9197 (statement of Rep. Goodell).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. "Congress in prescribing 'equal work' did not require that thejobs be iden-
tical, but only that they must be substantially equal. Any other interpretation would
destroy the remedial purpose of the Act." Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d
259, 265 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). "While the standard of equality
is clearly higher than mere comparability yet lower than absolute identity, there
remains an area of equality under the Act the metes and bounds of which are still
indefinite." Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1973).
Since at least 80 % of working women are doing traditional women's work, the equal
work requirement of the EPA is a significant burden. See notes 11 & 13 supra.
26. Unequal pay for equal work does not violate the EPA if it results from a
seniority system, a merit system, a system that measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production, or a differential based on any factor other than sex. See note
22 supra.
27. EEO Notes, 428 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 5 (1981).
The EEOC first assumed responsibility for enforcement of the Equal Pay Act in
1980. During fiscal 1980, it "closed 1,614 individual EPA complaints that resulted
6
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segregated, however, they are unable to meet the equal work standard and,
consequently, remain outside the scope of the EPA's protection. 28
Increasingly, these women are seeking relief under the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act outlaws sex
discrimination in hiring, firing, compensation, and in the terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment. 30 The comparable worth controversy is an
outgrowth of attempts by female plaintiffs to establish illegal sex discrimina-
tion in compensation under Title VII.31
A. Defining "Comparable Worth"
There is no generally accepted definition of "comparable worth." 32 The
difficulties arise because comparable worth litigants have failed to follow a
common path and judicial opinions are tailored to the facts of each.case.
Scholarly commentators also have contributed to the definitional morass. 33
Although generalization is difficult, it is possible to divide the concept of com-
parable worth into three broad categories: comparable value, pure com-
parable worth, and comparable work.
In a comparable value claim, the plaintiff attempts to establish that two
dissimilar jobs have comparable value to the employer and, therefore, deserve
comparable wages. For example, in Christensen v. Iowa,34 clerical workers
at the University of Northern Iowa alleged that the University policy of pay-
ing physical plant workers, who were predominantly men, more than clerical
workers, who were all women, was unlawful sex-based wage discrimination
in benefits of $1.9 million, and resolved 27 enforcement cases that involved $1.3
million in benefits." Id. The number of complaints brought under the EPA belies
the increasingly popular notion that sex discrimination in employment is a myth.
For a discussion of this position, see Gilder, TheMyths of Racial and SexualDiscrimina-
tion, 32 NAT'L REV. 1381, 1387 (1980) ("It is the greater aggressiveness of men,
biologically determined but statistically incalculable, that accounts for much of their
earnings superiority.").
28. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
29. See, e.g., Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
30. For the text of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination, see note 14
supra.
31. See generally note 14 supra.
32. See Pay Disparities and Comparable Worth, 1980 LAB. REL. Y.B. 158, 158-60.
33. See Comment, The Comparable Worth Theoy: A New Approach, 32 BAYLOR
L. REv. 629, 629-31 (1980); Comment, EqualPay, Comparable Work, andjobEvalua-
tion, 90 YALE LJ. 657,658 (1981) (comparable work is "work that is of equal value
or importance to the employer."). Former EEOC Vice Chair Daniel E. Leach went
so far as to characterize comparable worth as "a misnomer.., a euphemism. I
think basically it's been used by people to exploit this issue." Interview with Daniel
E. Leach, reprinted in THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE: A BNA SPECIAL REPORT
53 (1981).
34. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
1982]
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under Title VII. s3 The University had instituted a job evaluation system
in which each job was to be compensated on the basis of its objective worth
to the University. Clerical workers and physical plant workers were deem-
ed to be of equal value and placed in the same labor grade. When the Univer-
sity increased the starting pay for physical plant employees in order to raise
their wages to the level of the local job market, the clerical workers alleged
discrimination and filed suit under Title VII.36
A more abstract theory that comes under the generic heading of com-
parable worth is pure comparable worth.3 Under this theory, 38 when a
female plaintiff establishes that her job is performed primarily by women
and that the job's wages are low, "an inference of wage discrimination suf-
ficient to constitute a prima facie case" 39 is drawn. Proponents of a pure
comparable worth approach argue that the community wage rate reflects
stereotypical judgments of the value of work done by men and the value of
work done by women. Existing job evaluation plans, they say, are equally
infected with this prejudice. One commentator has noted:
[W]hen the job evaluation-community wage system is used to set
wages in jobs which are sex-segregated, discrimination has more pro-
bably than not been a negative influence on the value of those jobs.
The lower wage rate determination follows directly from the fact that
the jobs in question are substantially segregated by... sex40
This theory has incited intense criticism. 41 If the pure comparable worth
35. Id. at 354. ("Appellants . . . commenced this action under Title
VII... contending that UNI's practice of paying clerical workers.. . less than
'the amount it pays physical plant workers... forjobs of equal value to the University
constitutes illegal sex discrimination in compensation.").
36. Although the plaintiffs in Christensen were denied relief when the court of
appeals found that their claim was beyond the scope of Title VII, id. at 356, there
are signs that comparable value claims may be recognized in the future. See notes
65-87 & 116-20 and accompanying text infra.
37. The adjective "pure" is used because although the plaintiff alleges under-
compensation relative to his job's value, there is no attempt to establish this under-
valuation through a comparison with other, higher paying positions.
38. This theory received a degree of notoriety after the publication of a con-
troversial article by Ruth G. Blumrosen, a former consultant to the EEOC. See
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 12 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 399, 401 (1979) ("It is the thesis of this article that
job segregation and wage discrimination are not separate problems, but rather are
intimately related. Wherever there is job segregation, the same forces which deter-
mine that certain jobs or job categories will be reserved for women or minorities
also and simultaneously determine that the economic value of those jobs is less than
if they were 'white' or 'male' jobs.").
39. Id. at 459.
40. Id.
41. E.g., Spelfogel, supra note 1, at 31 ("[I]f this new doctrine finds accep-
[Vol. 47
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theory is accepted, an employer could be held liable for sex discrimination
in compensation without any showing that he discriminated between his.
employees. Pure comparable worth, moreover, might result in the disrup-
tion of large industries that employ predominantly women. No court has
yet recognized pure comparable worth, and there is no sign that judicial ap-
proval will soon be forthcoming.
42
The third type of comparable worth claim is based on comparable work.
A comparable work claim involves comparing jobs that are not identical but
are similar enough to be classified together.4 3 It focuses on the nature of the
work, not its value to the employer. All wage discrimination suits not based
on equal work involve analyzing the wages of different jobs for evidence of
sex discrimination. The less comparable the jobs, the more reluctant courts
have been to accept a difference in wages as evidence of discrimination.
44
A comparable work claim is less susceptible to this problem than a com-
parable value claim because the jobs compared are from the same occupa-
tional group. Because the theory of pure comparable worth has garnered
so little support, the remainder of this Comment will explore comparable
value and comparable work claims.
tance, it would cause the end or major modification of nearly every wage and com-
pensation plan and every job classification system in the country, supersede every
union contract, and destroy collective bargaining as we know it.").
42. In Oaks v. City of Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1981), the ci-
ty was sued by its female librarian who alleged that she should receive higher wages
than the heads of other city departments. No evidence was introduced showing that
the work involved was comparable or had comparable value to the city. The district
court disposed of the claim in the following manner: "Even if this court were to
adopt a 'comparable worth' approach, however, the undisputed facts in this case
would not permit Oaks to prevail. This court cannot conclude that the librarian's
position is comparable to that of city department heads who oversee the provision
of essential services to the populace of Fairhope. The services provided by the
librarian, no matter how desirable, are not essential to the daily life of the City as
are the operations of the police and the departments that provide electricity, water,
street maintenance and sewage treatment." Id. at 1040-41.
43. See Current Issues in Labor Relations-Comparable Worth, 1980 LAB. REL. Y.B.
150, 153-54.
44. A number of courts have been very disturbed by the prospect of having
to compare two completely different jobs in an attempt to discover sex-based wage
discrimination. "I asked, and I was very sincere in my request, that some expert
explain to me what one does or the Court is supposed to do when confronted with
the impossible problem of trying to determine.., relative worth.. .. " Lemons
v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 906, 909 (D.C. Colo.
1978). "The plaintiffs here say they want their pay to be compared with other oc-
cupations. Of couse they do. If that were done, it would give them more pay. But
I can find nothing in the law that requires that. It would be nice for the plaintiffs.
It would be completely disruptive of our way of life .... " Id. This objection does
not apply as forcefully if the claim is based on comparable work.
50319821
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B. The Bennett Amendment
The Bennett Amendment to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act pro-
vides that it is not unlawful "for an employer to differentiate upon the basis
of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensation ... to be paid
to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the
provisions of ... [the Equal Pay Act]." 45 This language is susceptible to
different interpretations. A number of courts have found that it forecloses
sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII unless the EPA's equal
work standard is satisfied.4 6 The contrary interpretation is that the Bennett
Amendment merely authorizes the use of the EPA's four affirmative
defenses47 in any wage discrimination suit based on Title VII. 48 In June 1981,
the United States Supreme Court entered the fray and, by a narrow margin,
accepted the latter view in County of Washington v. Gunther.49
Gunther involved guards at a sex-segregated county jail. Oregon law re-
quired that female inmates be guarded only by women. The male section
of the jail employed only male guards. The women contended that they
received lower wages than their male counterparts as a result of the county's
policy of intentional sex discrimination. 0 To buttress this allegation, the
female guards charged that the county set the pay scale for female guards,
but not for male guards, at a level lower than warranted by its own survey
of outside markets and the worth of the jobs. 51 The district court dismissed
the claim, holding as a matter of law that the Bennett Amendment required
satisfaction of the EPA equal work standard in every Tide VII sex-based
wage discrimination claim. 52 After sifting through the legislative history of
the Bennett Amendment, the court of appeals reversed.5 3 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals decision.
54
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
46. See Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) ("The Bennett Amendment is generally considered
to have the equal pay/equal work concept apply to Title VII in the same way as
it applies in the Equal Pay Act."). See also Molthan v. Temple Univ., 442 F. Supp.
448 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
47. For a list of the EPA's four affirmative defenses, see note 26 supra.
48. See International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1099 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1009 (1980) (the
"Bennett Amendment merely incorporates into Title VII the four exceptions outlin-
ed in the Equal Pay Act."). See also Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 501
F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
49. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
50. Id. at 164.
51. Id. at 165.
52. Gunther v. County of Washington, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 788,
791 n.7 (D.C. Ore. 1976).
53. Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303, 1313-14 (9th Cir.
1979).
54. 452 U.S. at 166.
504 [Vol. 47
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At the outset, the Court stressed the limits of its decision. "We em-
phasize . . . the narrowness of the question before us in this case.
Respondents' claim is not based on the controversial concept of 'comparable
worth'.... ,,15 The Court distinguished Gunther from a comparable worth
claim by noting that the "respondents seek to prove, by direct evidence,
that their wages were depressed because of intentional sex discrimination. "56
Nonetheless, Gunther ig certain to affect comparable worth litigation. With
its holding that "claims of discriminatory undercompensation are not bar-
red by ... [the Bennett Amendment] merely because respondents do not
perform work equal to that of male ... [employees] ,"'7 the Court effec-
tively separated the EPA from the Bennett Amendment to Title VII.58
C. Title VII
Title VII expressly forbids sex discrimination in compensation. 9
Nonetheless, it has been argued that even apart from the Bennett Amend-
ment, a lawsuit based on comparable worth is not within the scope of Title
VII.60 Various theories have been advanced to support this view. It has been
pointed out, for example, that the Civil Rights Act was enacted to guarantee
the rights of disenfranchised blacks. 61 There is no evidence that Congress
intended to countenance anything remotely like comparable worth. 62 There
is evidence to the contrary that Congress intended to define the scope of wage
discrimination claims narrowly. In enacting the EPA, Congress expressly
rejected comparable worth in favor of an equal work standard. 63 Finally,
Title VII was directed at equal employment opportunity,64 which comparable
worth plaintiffs do not allege has been denied.
Each of these arguments has been disputed. Although the Supreme
55. Id.
56. Id. Intentional sex discrimination is prohibited by the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. See note 14 supra. It appears that the judiciary is more comfortable providing
relief if the claim is considered in this context. See Wilkins v. University of Houston,
654 F.2d 388, 405 n.26 (5th Cir. 1981). It is, as yet, unclear at what point a com-
parable worth claim may be successfully characterized as intentional sex discrimina-
tion. If female plaintiffs are able to prove that their job value to the employer is
equal to that of higher paid male employees, the spectre of intentional sex discrimina-
tion rears its head. In this sense, overt judicial recognition of claims based on com-
parable worth may become less important.
57. 452 U.S. at 181.
58. Id.
59. See note 14 supra.
60. See generally Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and Title VII in
the 1980s: The Case Against Comparable Worth; 6 EMPL. REL. L.J. 380 (1981);
Spelfogel, supra note 1, at 31.
61. Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 6, at 295.
62. Id. at 296.
63. Id. at 265-67.
64. Id. at 295.
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Court in Gunther reserved opinion on comparable worth, it noted that the
federal courts must "avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims
of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate. "65 The
Court also referred to its earlier decision in City of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart,66 in which it explained the breadth of Title VII's
protection: "In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. "67
While this statement is dicta, it seems broad enough to encompass a lawsuit
based on comparable worth. The latitude with which the courts previously
have interpreted Title VII's broad mandate also seems to favor extending
coverage to comparable worth claims.6 8 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, for example, recently acknowledged that the ultimate
goal of Tite VII is to eliminate not only racial discrimination in employ-
ment but also sex discrimination.6 9 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act, a 1972 amendment to Title VII, emphasizes that the Civil Rights Act
requires the eradication of all discrimination based on sex. 70 Much can be
said for construing the statute in a manner that is consistent with this purpose.
The lack of express Congressional approval of comparable worth
claims in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act is not dispositive.
Judicial interpretation of Title VII's broad language often has reflected
the possibility of change. 7' The explicit legislative history of the
65. 452 U.S. at 178.
66. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
67. Id. at 707 n.13 (dictum).
68. Title VII "prohibits all practices in whatever form which create inequality
in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex,
or national origin." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
69. Chrisnerv. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1256 (6th Cir.
1981).
70. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). The legislative history of the Act notes that:
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class. Their self-fulffllment
and development is frustrated because of their sex. Numerous studies have
shown that women are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible,
and the less remunerative positions on the basis of their sex alone.
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objectionable in view
of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimination since
its enactment in 1964.
H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2140.
71. There is no indication in the legislative history of Title VII that sexual
harassment, for example, was intended to be actionable under the Civil Rights Act.
Indeed, for the first 12 years the law was in force, sexual harassment was not con-
sidered among the varieties of discrimination prohibited under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123,124 (D.D.C. 1974). In 1976,
[Vol. 47
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EPA,72 moreover, is irrelevant to claims brought under the 1964
Civil Rights Act. As Gunther made clear, the EPA does not limit
recovery under Title VII. The Court addressed the harsh conse-
quences of such a restrictive reading of Title VII:
In practical terms, this means that a woman who is discriminatorily
underpaid could obtain no relief-no matter how egregious the
discrimination might be-unless her employer also employed a man
in an equal job in the same establishment, at a higher rate of pay.
Thus, if an employer hired a woman for a unique position in the
company and then admitted that her salary would have been higher
had she been male, the woman would be unable to obtain legal
redress .... Similarly, if an employer used a transparently sex-biased
system for wage determination, women holding jobs not equal to
those held by men would be denied the right to prove that the system
is a pretext for discrimination. 73
The argument that Title VII is primarily aimed at ensuring equal
employment opportunity is little more than a truism. The language of the
Act expressly forbids sex discrimination in compensation. 74 Its guarantee
of equal employment opportunity does not weaken, undermine, or remove
the wage discrimination provision of the Act. "With the Civil Rights Act
of 1963, Congress released a strong and forceful weapon against employ-
ment discrimination." 75 It is spurious to argue that the acknowledged goal
of Title VII equal employment opportunity dilutes the wage discrimination
language of the Act.
One of the strongest arguments against allowing Title VII claims based
on comparable worth is the alleged economic dislocation that would ensue. 76
Comparable worth, it has been said, is a "storm of cyclonic proportions
which, if left unchecked, may soon rip through the American economy
costing untold millions of dollars to business and labor." 77 The economic
consequences have been argued frequently and forcefully by opponents of
comparable worth. A number of federal courts have accepted this logic78
the judicial tide began to turn and today there is universal support for such a claim
based upon Title VII. See 1 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 8-97 to
8-117 (1981).
72. The legislative history of the EPA is discussed in Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion in Gunther. See 452 U.S. at 184-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 178-79.
74. See note 14 supra.
75. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1107 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1009 (1980). The
court then paraphrased the Supreme Court's language in United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S 193, 204 (1979), to the effect that it would be ironic if the passage
of the EPA, which was designed to remedy years of sex discrimination, led to a con-
traction of the rights guaranteed by Title VII. 631 F.2d at 1107.
76. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 6, at 290-97; note 41 supra.
77. Spelfogel, supra note 1, at 30.
78. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Appellant's
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and ruled that Title VII was not designed to restructure the entire economy
of the United States. 79 On the other hand, it can be argued that this logic
misconstrues the goals of the Civil Rights Act and the practical scope of com-
parable worth. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to eliminate
discrimination.80 There is no language in the Act immunizing discriminatory
behavior which is so deeply ingrained that there will be an economic effect
if it is discovered and eradicated. While the successful integration of women
into the traditional confines of male employment may provide its own in-
crease in efficiency, economic stability was not then and is not now the
primary goal of Title VII.81 It is also unlikely that comparable worth claims,
if entertained, will have the calamitous economic effect that opponents
predict. The possibility of pure comparable worth suits is not seriously
entertained.8 2 Comparable value and comparable work are localized com-
plaints. Both focus on comparisons within a single employer. The difficulty
of proof, the array of recognized defenses,83 and the irrelevance of broad
societal comparisons belie any prospect of vast economic upheaval.
In Gunther, the Supreme Court expressly held that equal work is not re-
quired by the Bennett Amendment but declined to delineate the precise con-
tours of comparable worth challenges permissible under Title VII. 84 In a
real sense, Gunther skirted the issue. Not only did it involve two groups of
employees doing comparable work, 85 the county's own wage study provided
theory ignores economic realities .... We find nothing in the text and history of
Title VII suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of supply and de-
mand .... ).
79. Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
906, 909 (D.C. Colo. 1978).
80. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicates that Con-
gress was primarily concerned with protecting the rights of black Americans. See
S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2355, 2365. That the Act applies with equal force to the rights of women,
however, was made clear when it was amended in 1972. "This Committee believes
that women's rights are not judicial divertissements. Discrimination against women
is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and is to be
accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful discrimina-
tion." H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2141.
81. For a discussion of this issue, see Comment, Equal Pay, Comparable Work,
and Job Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657, 671-72 (1981).
82. See notes 37-42 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 26 & 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
84. 452 U.S. at 181. "The Court's interpretation of the Bennett Amendment
... leaves the door open to 'comparable worth' claims since the 'equal work' stan-
dard of the Equal Pay Act will not be required in a Title VII action." 1 A. LAR-
SON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 7-127 (1981).
85. The EPA's equal work standard was not satisfied in Gunther because the
district court determined that "male guards supervised more than 10 times as many
[Vol. 47
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such damning evidence that the court could characterize the case as one in-
volving intentional sex discrimination. To the extent that suits based on com-
parable worth lack these elements, it is unclear whether Tide VII will grant
relief. Litigants will undoubtedly use Gunther's broad dicta concerning
TitleVI1 86 to urge recognition of comparable value as well as comparable
work claimsY7
IV. PROVING A COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIM
While Gunther is technically a comparable work case, it contains hints
for both comparable work and comparable value claimants. In Gunther, the
defendants presented the standard argument for denying relief to female
plaintiffs in comparable worth litigation: if successful, "Tide VII plaintiffs
could draw any type of comparison imaginable concerning job duties and
pay between any job predominantly performed by women and any job
predominantly performed by men." 88 Such a comparison would place "the
pay structure of virtually every employer and the entire economy.., at risk
and subject to scrutiny by the federal courts." ,8 9 The plaintiffs were able to
deflect this argument with the proof offered to support their claim:
"[R]espondents' suit does not require a court to make its own subjective
assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs, or to attempt
by statistical technique or other method to quantify the effect of sex
discrimination on the wage rates. "90 A plaintiff seeking to come under the
Gunther umbrella must show two things: that her job is comparable to those
of higher paid male employees and that the wage disparity results from sex
discrimination. Comparable value plaintiffs who are unable to prove com-
parable work must place more emphasis on the second half of this equation.
The most valuable tool for proving sex discrimination in compensation
is, perhaps, the employer's own job evaluation plan. In Gunther, the Court
readily acknowledged the importance of the county's plan to the plaintiff's
case. 91 In a comparable value case, the offer of such a plan might well be
prisoners per guard as did the female guards, and that the females devoted much
of their time to less-valuable clerical duties." 452 U.S. at 165.
86. See notes 65-67 & 73 and accompanying text supra.
87. Christensen v. Iowa may be such a case. See notes 34-36 and accompany-
ing text supra. The concurring opinion in Christensen indicated that the University
policy of providing higher starting wages for beginning physical plant workers but
not for beginning clerical workers "established a prima facie case of sex discrimina-
tion unless.., the 'Bennett Amendment' appli[ed]." 563 F.2d at 357 (Miller, J.,
concurring). The concurring judge found that the Bennett Amendment did apply
and precluded the suit. In Gunther, the Supreme Court disagreed. 452 U.S. at 181.
88. 452 U.S. at 180 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 101).
89. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 99-100).
90. Id. at 181.
91. Id. at 180-81.
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vital. Fortunately for potential Title VII litigants, job evaluation plans are
widely used in the public and private sectors. 92
There are different types of job evaluations, but each shares the same
basic methodology. Initially, the jobs in question are meticulously describ-
ed. This step may involve a number of different procedures: job ques-
tionaires, interviews with the workers, or simple observation. Each job is
then broken down with respect to its duties, responsibilities, working con-
ditions, degree of difficulty, and any other relevant factors. The jobs then
are ranked in terms of value to the organization. Finally, the completed job
plan is used to help set the wages of the organization's employees.
Job evaluation plans can be used in two different ways by comparable
worth litigants. If female employees, unlike their male counterparts, are not
compensated in accordance with the job evaluation plan, the plan can be
offered as evidence of intentional sex discrimination.93 If female employees
92. D. TREIMAN, JOB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW-INTERIM
REPORT TO THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 1 (1979).
Two points about job evaluation are worth repeating. First, it is work that is
evaluated, not workers. Second, it is current work rather than work done in the
past that is studied. Hand, Classification Memo to the Seattle Personnel Depart-
ment, at 1 (Sept. 2, 1981). There are four basic types of job evaluation systems.
Ranking is the simplest. All jobs are ranked in order of value to the employer.
Classification entails a predetermined hierarchical structure of categories determin-
ed by various factors believed to be required by the job. The U.S. Civil Service
system is an example of classification. Factor Comparison systems work as follows:
A small number of factors are chosen on which to base each job evaluation. A set
of benchmark jobs are then selected. These are jobs the value of which is not
disputed. The benchmark jobs are then ranked according to their total worth and
the remaining jobs are structured around them. Point Methods also involve a set of
compensable factors. For each factor, a scale is devised representing different levels
of worth. Each level is assigned a number of points. The individual jobs are then
rated as to every factor separately, the point totals are added up, and the hierarchy
created is used to schedule wages. Id. at 2-4.
93. Such job evaluation plan evidence might have been extremely useful, for
example, in Christensen. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra. See also Wilkins
v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981). Wilkins was a class action
suit brought by female employees of the University of Houston who alleged that
the University engaged in sex-based wage discrimination within the academic divi-
sion of the professional and administrative staff. The plaintiffs introduced no"
evidence that within the academic division women were being paid less than men
for equal work. Rather, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of sex discrimina-
tion within the University's pay plan. In the plan, all professional administrative
and staff positions were objectively analyzed and placed in one of nine salary levels.
Within each level, there were minimum and maximum wage figures that employees
at that level could receive. The academic division of the professional and ad-
ministrative staff employed 68 people-35 of whom were women. Twenty-one
academic division employees were paid less than the minimum wage prescribed
for the level in which their job fell. Of these 21, 18 were women. Statistical analysi:
510 [Vol. 47
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are paid according to the plan, the plan itself can be attacked as
discriminatory. 94
Despite the prevalence ofjob evaluation plans, questions remain about
their use in Title VII litigation. It is unclear, for example, whetherjob evalua-
tions conducted on behalf of a comparable worth plaintiff are evidence of
a discriminatory compensation policy on the part of the employer. One
federal district court has indicated that such plans are admissible evidence. 95
This court also concluded that intentional wage discrimination can be in-
ferred from the employer's failure to undertake "any evaluation which would
have indicated the value of the jobs held by either men or women.' '96
One circuit court of appeals has ruled that in the course of an investiga-
tion, the EEOC can obtain, via subpoena if necessary, information concer-
ning the sex, salary levels, experience, and job responsibilities of the
employees of the business being investigated.9 7 The Supreme Court has held
that an individual who files ajob discrimination claim with EEOC is entitled
to disclosure of the information obtained by the EEOC during its
investigation.9 8 As part of the duty to bargain in good faith, an employer
must disclose relevant employment information to its employees' bargain-
indicated that this pay differential was unlikely to be fortuitous. Further, several
of the women paid below the minimum rate set for their job classification were subse-
quently reclassified to a lower job level. Wilkins is important for several reasons.
It recognizes that the EPA's equal work standard is not applicable in a Title VII
wage discrimination suit. It also allows a plaintiff to use comparison between wages
paid to male and female employees within the same salary level as evidence of
discrimination. Finally, Wilkins implies that statistical evidence culled from a com-
parison of wages in different job levels can be used in a Title VII sex-based wage
discrimination suit. In this sense, it goes beyond both Gunther and the theory of com-
parable worth.
94. The less comparable the jobs, however, the greater the plaintiff's burden
will be. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. But see International Union of Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1009 (1980). The Westinghouse wage scale was based on a
uniform key sheet with various pay grades and levels. These grades were osten-
sibly sex-neutral. The female plaintiffs brought the Title VII claim because they
felt the compensation plan was based on Westinghouse's 1930 wage manual, which
stated that men were compensated according to a separate, higher wage scale. The
court held that the plaintiffs' charges, if proven, would be grounds for relief under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1097.
95. Taylor v. Charley Bros., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602, 612 (W.D.
Pa. 1981) ("However, plaintiffs' expert employed ajob evaluation plan which has
been more widely used and tested ... than defendants' expert's job evaluation
plan.").
96. Id. at 614.
97. EEOC v. University of Pittsburg, 643 F.2d 983, 985 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 362 (1981).
98. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590 (1981).
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ing representative.9 9 Much of this information may be useful in discover-
ing sex-based wage discrimination. 10 0 There is as yet no indication that
employees can force their employer to disclose personnel information or con-
duct a job evaluation. In spite of the uncertainty that surrounds the use of
these plans, future Title VII litigation will rely increasingly on them as
evidence of sex-based wage discrimination. 101
V. DEFENDING A COMPARABLE WORTH CLAIM
Since Gunther incorporated the EPA's four affirmative defenses into Title
VII sex-based wage discrimination claims, 10 2 it is clear that employers may
lawfully differentiate between the sexes with regard to compensation if such
differentiation is based on seniority, merit, or quality and quantity of pro-
duction. The fourth affirmative defense, however, presents some interesting
possibilities. It permits a wage disparity if the differential is "based on any
factors other than sex." 103 The breadth of this language raises significant
questions. If a female plaintiff establishes that herjob and a higher paid male
job have equal value to the employer, for example, can the employer assert
that the higher wage merely reflects the higher market rate for certain
employees? If the male employee's higher wage is deemed necessary to re-
tain his services, there is arguably no sex discrimination unless the female
employee is not being compensated in accordance with her market value.
A market defense may carry great weight with courts already unenthusiastic
about the concept of comparable worth. 10 4 In Gunther, the Court reserved
opinion on this question.10 5 One lower federal court, however, has inter-
preted Gunther as repudiating the market rate as ajustification for a sex-based
99. The duty to bargain in good faith is contained in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d) (1976).
100. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 409-15 (1976).
101. There are several other factors that may influence the course of a com-
parable worth claim. The employer's current methods of hiring, assigning jobs,
and issuing transfers or promotions influence a court's conception of the case. Any
history of past discrimination by the employer also may play a significant role.
102. 452 U.S. at 167-68.
103. See note 22 supra.
104. The Christensen court, for example, noted:
Appellants' theory ignores economic realities. The value of the job to the
employer represents but one factor affecting wages. Other factors may in-
clude the supply of workers willing to do the job and the ability of the
workers to band together to bargain collectively for higher wages. We find
nothing in the text and history of Title VII suggesting that Congress in-
tended to abrogate the laws of supply and demand or other economic prin-
ciples that determine wage rates for various kinds of work. We do not in-
terpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting
wage rates for genuinely different work classifications.
563 F.2d at 356.
105. "[W]e do not decide in this case how sex-based wage discrimination litiga-
[Vol. 47
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wage disparity. 10 6 This issue is important because the procedural structure
of Title VII litigation has significant impact on the success of such claims.1 0
7
In the long run, the most effective way for employers to insulate
themselves from Title VII liability is to eliminate job segregation by sex. 108
The success of such efforts will depend in part on the willingness of male
and female workers to.move into areas traditionally considered the domain
of the other sex. Nonetheless, through targeted hiring policies, careful use
of promotions and transfers, and aggressive training programs, ghettoiza-
tion of the American working woman can be reduced significantly. 109 Com-
plete job integration is, however, a long-term solution. In the meantime,
employers can take a number of steps to provide more immediate protection.
First, the business community can analyze existing job evaluation and
compensation plans to determine whether they are infected with intentional
sex discrimination. 110 If the factors used in gauging job value' are
discriminatory or deviations from an internal schedule based on comparable
value cannot be satisfactorily explained, voluntary adjustments can be
made.11 2 Formal statements of an employer's willingness to compensate on
the basis ofjob value can become part of an employer's personnel portfolio.'"s
Finally, businesses can begin to employ males in areas traditionally reserv-
tion under Title VII should be structured to accommodate the fourth affirmative
defense of the Equal Pay Act. . . ." 452 U.S. at 171.
106. Koubav. Allstate Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 148, 161 (E.D. Cal. 1981) ("It
appears that the Supreme Court has limited the application of the fourth affirmative
defense to a 'bona fide job rating system', . . . and thus where the jobs are 'rated'
the same, unequal pay cannot be justified on the basis of 'other factors other than
sex'.").
107. See generally Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
108. See Conference Focus on Comparable Worth, 397 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS 3 (1980); Sex-based WageDiscrimination: Combatting the Claim, 425 FEP
SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 3 (1981); Supervisors' Guide to EEO Issues,
415 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 6 (1981).
109. See 425 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 108, at
3. This commentator argues that action taken to bring "women into nontraditional
positions will cut off... back pay liability for an employer whether or not the job
offer is accepted." Id.
110. Id.
111. Some of the traditional factors associated with job value are scope of
responsibility, difficulty of work, degree of knowledge required, level of social skills
required, and relevant work environment. See, e.g., Primary Standard, City of Seat-
tle Personnel Department (1980).
112. See ABA Convention Reviews the Supreme Court's Gunther Decision, 428 FEP
SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 6 (1981); 415 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 108, at 3.
113. See 425 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 108, at 3.
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ed for women, undercutting any perception that the employer channels new
employees into particular areas on the basis of gender.1 14
VI. THE FUTURE OF COMPARABLE WORTH
The comparable worth concept is currently in limbo. Gunther involved
female plaintiffs doing work comparable to that done by male counterparts.
The county's wage plan provided evidence that the county compensated the
male guards, but not the female guards, at a level warranted by market con-
ditions and job value.115 Gunther provides no impetus for arguing that oc-
cupational segregation and low wages alone are sufficient indicia of
discrimination to allow recovery under Title VII. Pure comparable worth
is still impractical and unlikely to receive judicial recognition.
The future of comparable worth suits that attempt to prove organiza-
tional job value via job evaluation plans, on the other hand, remains pro-
mising. Several lawsuits challenging sex discrimination in compensation cur-
rently are pending before federal courts. In 1979, the Connecticut State
Employees Association (CSEA), which represents a portion of the state's
clerical workers, sued in federal court on behalf of all female employees of
the state government. The CSEA suit charged, among other things, that
the state's job evaluation system illegally accorded women's jobs lower
values.1 16 The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME) sought to intervene in the suit in 1981, alleging in
part that the state compensated women at lower rates than men doing work
of comparable value.1 1 7 AFSCME also claimed that Connecticut's system
ofjob classification was patently discriminatory. To support this allegation,
the organization cited a study commissioned by the state legislature which
showed that male employees earned from eight to eighteen percent more
114. Employers may take a different approach altogether. To make job com-
parisons difficult, employers have been advised to use different job evaluation
systems for different jobs. See 428 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS,
supra note 112, at 6. Use of plans that evaluate jobs in terms of point totals also have
been discouraged. Id. It is possible that use ofjob evaluation plans will decline in
light of Gunther's emphasis that such plans may be used as evidence of wage
discrimination. In light of the organizational benefits obtained from these plans,
however, it is unlikely they will be scrapped. Job evaluation plans serve a number
of objectives: wage and salary equity, consistency and uniformity in operation, bet-
ter promotion and placement policies, standardization of wages and salaries, bet-
ter morale, better control over wage and salary costs, improved organization, cur-
tailed employee grievances, better personnel administration, and better return on
salary investment. E. LANHAM, JOB EVALUATION 381 (1955). Job evaluation plans
also provide a framework for a review of wages and salaries as well as a basis for
negotiation with labor unions. Id. at 5.
115. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
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than women employed in jobs of comparable value. 118 In 1981, AFSCME
filed a series of complaints with the EEOC charging that the State of
Washington was "deliberately maintaining sex-segregated job classifications
in which female employees are compensated less than male employees for
work of equal value to the employer." 119 These suits will play a large part
in further defining the contours of sex-based wage discrimination claims
recognized under Title VII.
The EEOC, which has taken an active part in comparable worth litiga-
tion, will continue its efforts to find proper cases for the courts. 120 In the wake
of Gunther, the EEOC sent a memorandum to its field offices advising that
women involved in wage discrimination litigation should seek relief under
both the EPA and Title VII. 121 EEOC staffers were instructed to inform the
complainant of the relative coverage of the two statutes and the advantages
of filing under both. 122 Investigators were also asked to assemble informa-
tion on employer compensation structures.123 Much of this information could
be used to establish the relative worth of the jobs involved, and therefore
may have an appreciable effect on the volume of future comparable worth
litigation.
During the Carter administration, the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs (OFCCP) clearly supported the notion of comparable
worth. 124 In 1979, the OFCCP sought to amend its sex discrimination
guidelines so that the compensation practices of employers doing business
with the federal government could be examined for sex-based wage
discrimination. 125 This revision was halted by President Reagan soon after
118. Id.
119. Id. at 32.
120. Id. at 15-16.
121. Advice from EEOC, 430 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 1
(1981).
122. Id.
123. Some of the pertinent information included the following: a breakdown
ofjob classifications by sex, written detailed job descriptions, wage schedules by
sex, history of wage schedules, information on job evaluation systems, and copies
of any collective bargaining agreement that was a basis of a sex-based wage dif-
ferential. Id.
124. See Contract Compliance Enforcement Review, 409 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS 4 (1980). See also Investigation Guidelinesfor Discrimination Complaints,
410 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 4 (1980); Strategy to Meet OFCCP
Enforcement Efforts, 396 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 4 (1980).
125. The following language was to be added to the OFCCP's Sex Discrimina-
tion Guidelines:
Sec. 60-20.5 Discriminatory wages and placements.
(a) Wages...
While the more obvious cases of discrimination exist where employees
of different sexes are paid different wages on jobs which require substan-
tially equal skill, effort and responsibility and are performed under similar
1982]
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he took office and has now been discarded. Although the status of the EEOC
and the OFCCP as active participants in the comparable worth controversy
is now in doubt, the machinery for such participation remains intact.
While the OFCCP and the EEOC can exert a measure of influence on
the compensation practices of particular employers, labor unions are in the
strongest position to address the issue of sex-based wage discrimination.1 26
Women comprise twenty-seven percent of current union membership, and
increasing this figure is one of organized labor's top priorities. 127 As this
percentage rises, more attention will be paid to the rights of the working
woman. Unions have a wealth of information pertaining to wage structure
and job content. By participating in wage discrimination studies and help-
ing document the existence of pay inequities, unions could provide signifi-
cant support for individual comparable worth claimants. Unions can exert
even greater influence by flexing their muscles on behalf of women during
the collective bargaining process.' 28 Although union support may not be
unanimous, at least one major organization has publicly challenged "in-
tentional discrimination in formulating classification ofjobs and in setting
the wages paid for these classifications. 11 29 More than one expert has
working conditions, compensation practices with respect to any jobs where
males or females are concentrated will be scrutinized closely to assure that
sex has played no role in the setting of levels of pay.
126. See Organizing Women, 389 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
6 (1980).
127. See Conference on Women and Labor Organization, 1980 LAB. REL. Y.B. 242;
Union Organizing Campaigns and Women, id. at 244.
128. See generally COALITION OF LABOR UNION WOMEN, EFFECTIVE CON-
TRACT LANGUAGE FOR UNION WOMEN 15-18 (1980).
129. Letter from Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (August 2, 1981), reprinted in THE COM-
PARABLE WORTH ISSUE: ABNA SPECIAL REPORT 128 (1981). At its 1979 constitu-
tional convention, the AFL-CIO passed a resolution urging "its affiliates to adopt
the concept of equal pay for work of comparable value in organizing and in
negotiating collective agreements." See Policy Resolution Regarding Comparable
Worth, adopted December 1979 by the Thirteenth Constitutional Convention AFL-
010, reprinted in THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE: A BNA SPECIAL REPORT 132
(1981). The convention approved this resolution, however, only after heated
arguments among AFL-CIO staff members in preconvention meetings and among
union presidents in the convention's resolution committee. The New Pay Push For
Women, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 17, 1979, at 69. Indeed, no woman has ever been ap-
pointed to the AFL-CIO's 35 member Executive Council. Further, while 271% of
the federation members are women, they hold only 5 % of the union's policy mak-
ing positions. See Hubbell, The State of the Unions-For Women, WORKING WOMAN,
June 1980, at 62. It is unclear, therefore, how strongly the AFL-CIO will support
comparable worth.
It is difficult to speculate on the rest of organized labor. Traditionally, the
economic position of the woman worker has never been classified as a pressing con-
cern. "Organized labor often has relegated the woman union members to second-
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predicted that organized labor will play a more prominent role in the resolu-
tion of these issues, 130 especially in view of the probable effect of the Reagan
administration on the EEOC and the OFCCP. 13 1
The activities of women's rights groups have been stimulated by the
Court's decision in Gunther. The National Association of Office Workers has
served notice that it intends to investigate comparable worth in industries
where significant numbers of men and women are employed in comparable
jobs. 132 The banking and insurance industries have already been targeted.
State legislatures also have become involved in the issue of sex-based
wage discrimination. 133 A significant number of states have enacted statutes
mandating equal pay for comparable work or work of comparable
character.134 The procedural mechanics of these statutes vary, as do the sanc-
tions imposed for violations. Litigation under these laws has been .sparse,
but state court challenges to wage discrimination may become a viable alter-
native if aggrieved plaintiffs are unable to obtain relief in federal court.
VII. CONCLUSION
Comparable worth may be largely an illusory issue. Read narrowly, Gun-
ther only authorized relief if the female plaintiff could prove she was the vic-
tim of intentional sex discrimination. To the extent that comparable worth
plaintiffs can establish, through evidence such as job evaluation plans, that
they are being undercompensated relative to male employees, they may ob-
tain relief. In this sense, the controversy is really just a matter of how one
is permitted to prove such a claim. Should the courts ever authorize recovery
solely on the basis of job segregation and low wages, the focus will shift
drastically. There is no indication, however, that any such departure is
imminent.
class membership, refused her admission to apprenticeship and job-upgrading pro-
grams and has kept her, through classification schemes, in low-paying, low-skilljobs." Hubbell, supra, at 67. Significant changes in these policies may await the
time when women rise to power within the union hierarchy. For an exhaustive
discussion of the role of women in United States labor unions, see P. FONER,
WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE (1981).
130. See Conference Focus on Comparable Worth, 397 FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS 3,4 (1980).
131. See Problems along the Potomac: EEOC Slowdown... OFCCP Cutbacks, 436
FEP SUMMARY OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 5, 5-6 (1981).
132. Interview with Ellen Cassedy, Program Director for the National Associa-
tion of Office Workers, reprinted in THE COMPARABLE WORTH ISSUE: A BNA
SPECIAL REPORT 57 (1981).
133. A few state legislatures have ordered state personnel to conduct investiga-
tions into the comparable worth of state jobs. Washington and Nebraska are two
such states.
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The furor surrounding comparable worth may prompt employers to re-
evaluate and amend existing employment practices to ensure that all
employees are receiving equal opportunities and fair wages. Any such
behavior will benefit the working woman.
GEORGE T. FLOROS
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